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1. Introduction 
In a recent issue of this Review Seidl (1994) published  a critical  evaluation 
on the sensibility  of a concept  which we and others  utilize a great deal, viz., 
the Leyden  Individual  Welfare  Function  of Income  (LIFWI).  Seidl concludes 
that  ‘this edifice  is not  built  on solid  ground,  neither  from  the point  of 
economic  theory  nor of experimental  psychology’.  It will not be surprising 
that we read this paper with more than  usual interest.  Our main conclusion 
is that his critique  is essentially  non-substantial  and may be discarded. 
Seidel’s critique  may be split up under  two headings: 
(a) Is the lognormal  welfare function  a reasonable  utility  function  of income 
against  the background  of economic  literature  and evidence  from experimen- 
tal psychology?  (see Seidl, sections  3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 4). 
(b) How reasonable  is the theory  given in Van Praag  (1968)  vP68 for short, 
which suggests the lognormal  specification?  (see sections  3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.5). 
Due to space limitations  we will focus in this paper  on the issues under 
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(a).  In  a  more  complete  version  of  this  rejoinder  (available  on  request  from 
the  first  author)  we  deal  with  the  points  under  (b)  as  well.  With  respect  to 
the  second  set  of  issues  let  us  say  here  only  that  we  do  not  think  that  Seidl 
has  given  any  substantial  critique,  and  that,  even  if his critique  of  this  theory 
on  the  genesis  of  the  lognormal  welfare  function  would  have  been  substan- 
tial,  this  would  not  imply  that  the  incriminated  specification  may  not  yield 
good  and  plausible  results  as  a  descriptor  of  economic  phenomena  in  the 
sense  that  the  empirical  apparatus  yields  stable,  non-trivial  and  plausible 
results  for  practical  problems.  After  all,  all  functional  speci~~ations  in  the 
literature  except  the  LIFWI  are  not  based  on  an  elaborate  theory  at  all  but 
just  postulated. 
However,  before  turning  to  SeidI’s critique,  it  is  appropriate  to  say  a  few 
words  on  the  setting  of  the  Leyden  approach  and  on  how  the  lognormal 
speci~cation  was derived  in vP68. 
2.  Preliminary  remarks 
During  the  last  twenty  years  there  has  been  a  persistent  trickle  of 
contributions  which  make  use  of  a  specific  questioning  approach  to  gauge 
the  evaluation  of  income  amounts  by  individuals.  This  is  done  by  the  so- 
called  WFI-approach  or  Leyden  approach.  We  refer  to  Seidl’s  bibliography 
(until  1988)  for  general  references  [for  later  references  see  e.g.  Van  Praag 
(I991),  Van  Praag  (1994a,b),  Kapteyn  (1994)J. 
Actually,  the  Leyden  approach  may  be  split  up  into  three  strands: 
(a)  the  formulation  of a  theory; 
(b)  the  estimation  of models  suggested  by  theory; 
(c)  the  applications. 
In  the  Leyden  paradigm  the  construction  of  a  theory  was  started  in  vP68, 
followed  by  Kapteyn  (1977)  and  later  on  much  theory  has  been  formulated 
jointly  with  estimations  and  applications  in  e.g.  Hagenaars  (1986),  etc.  The 
stage  under  (b)  begins  in  Van  Praag  (1971),  Van  Praag  and  Kapteyn  (1973) 
and  Kapteyn  and  Van  Praag  (1976).  In  these  articles  a  practical  subjective 
question  module  is proposed  to  catch  a  hitherto  unmeasurable  concept,  viz., 
a  welfare  function  of  income.  Here  we  use  the  lognormal  model  and  we  try 
to  estimate  its  parameters  and  to  explain  the  parameters  by  objectively 
measurabIe  characteristics. 
Under  (c)  we  apply  the  model,  for  instance,  to  the  derivation  of  family 
equivalence  scales  [see  Van  Praag  and  Kapteyn  (1973)  and  Kapteyn  and 
Van  Praag  (1976)  and  Kapteyn  (1994)J  the  estimation  of  social  reference 
groups  [see  Van  de  Stadt  et  al.  (1985)],  climate  equivalence  scales  [see  Van 
Praag  (1988)],  poverty  concepts  [see  Goedhart  et  al.  (1977),  Hagenaars  and 
Van  Praag  (1985)],  etc.  There  we estimate  for  instance  the  equation 3.M.S.  van  Praag  and  A.  Kapteyn,  How  sensible  is the  LIWFI?  1819 
~=~O+~lln~+~~lny=  (1) 
where  fs  and  y,  stand  for  family  size  and  current  income  of  the  respondent. 
The  parameter  p  is  a  welfare  parameter  to  be  explained  later  on.  We  and 
others  found  in scores  of large-scale  samples  rather  stable  coefficients. 
3.  Theoretical foundations 
The  main  gist  of  vP68  cannot  be  deduced  from  Seidl’s  fragmentary 
account.  The  book  which  was  published  in  1968, hence  more  than  26(!) years 
ago,  was  aimed  as  an  attempt  to  revitalize  the  (cardina1)  utility  concept.  In 
those  days  the  utility  concept  was  almost  eliminated  as a concept  to  describe 
consumer  behaviour  in  favour  of  the  (revealed)  preference  approach.  Our 
point  of departure  was  that  nearly  ail individuals  feel able  to  and  do  evaluate 
their  own  situation  or  external  phenomena  in  relative  terms  by  positioning 
the  situation  somewhere  between  a  ‘worst’  situation  and  a  ‘best’  situation, 
hence  on  a  finite  interval  scale.  An  example  is  the  ladder-scale  devised  by 
Cantril  (1965), by  which  people  are  asked  to  evaluate  their  own  life situation 
on  a  zero-ten  scale.  Experience  in  hundreds  of  surveys  shows  that  respon- 
dents  are  able  to  do  this.  With  respect  to  phenomena  like  the  quality  of  a 
music  or  ballet  performance,  the  quality  of  a  product  or  ratings  of  school 
performances,  numerical  evaIuation  seems  a  regular  and  common  procedure. 
Numerical  evaluation  is performed  as  a  matter  of  routine  and  always  within 
the  framework  of a  bounded  interval. 
Hence,  if  a  utility’  function  U(x)  is  a  descriptor  of  an  evaluation  of  a 
commodity  bundle  x  in  R”,  it  is  also  an  application  of  this  general 
observation  to  assume  that  U(x)  is  a  bounded  function  on  a  finite  interval, 
say  [0,  11. This  triggered  the  idea  to  see  utility  as  a  normed  measure  W  on 
the  commodity  space.  The  utility  of  a  commodity  bundle  x  is  then  the  W 
measure  assigned  to  the  rectangular  block  [0,x]  in  R”. This  led to  the  idea  to 
exploit  the  isomorphism  between  the  probability  mode1 where  the  probability 
mass  P  is  spread  over  R” and  this  welfare  measure  model  where  a  welfare 
mass  W  is  spread  over  the  commodity  space.  In  that  case  the  separate 
commodity  dimensions,  denoted  by  Xi,.  . . , X,,  take  the  role  of  random 
variables  in the  probability  model  and  the  rectangular  block  is described  as a 
set  {X+X)  to  which  we  assign  a  welfare  measure  W({Xex})=  U(x),  Notice 
that  in  probability  the  basic  set  is  a  point  in  R” with  its  associated  mass 
density  function,  while  in  the  commodity  context  the  basic  set  is  the  block 
{X s  x} with  the  corresponding  welfare  value  U(x). 
One  of  the  results  in  vP68  is  that  by  employing  the  analogy  with 
probability  theory  and  more  specifically  the  Central  Limit  Theorem  one  can 
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show  that  under  a  specific  set  of  assumptions  a  money  amount  y  spent  on  a 
specific  broad  commodity  group  will  be  evaluated  approximately  by  a 
lognormal  distribution  function  /l(y;  ,u, a)  and  this  result  carries  over  to  more 
dimensions.  This  result  is  derived  by  assuming  that  commodities  according 
to  Lancaster  (1966)  may  be  translated  into  bundles  of  characteristics,  and 
that  those  characteristics  are  defined  by  the  human  mind  in  such  a  way  that 
they  can  be  evaluated  independently  of  each  other.  Examples  are  found  in 
consumer  tests  like  in  ‘Which’  where  for  instance  the  performance  of  a  PC  is 
decomposed  into  k  characteristics  like  keyboard,  monitor,  storage,  fast 
memory,  speed,  etc.  Assuming  that  a  money  amount  y  stands  for  specific 
combinations  of  characteristics,  it  is  shown  that  as  a  first  approximation  the 
welfare  value  of  an  amount  y  spent  on,  say,  a  PC  follows  a  lognormal 
distribution  function. 
In  vP68  it  is  made  perfectly  clear  that  this  is  an  approximation,  but  it  is 
well-known  from  probability  theory  that  the  convergence  to  the  normal 
distribution  is  remarkably  good  even  for  modest  values  of  k.  In  vP68  it  is 
also  stressed  that  this  preliminary  evaluation  of  money  amounts,  which  is 
necessary  for  distributing  one’s  income  over  various  expenditure  categories, 
exaggerates  the  welfare  value  of  y;  later  on,  while  actually  spending  the 
amount  y,  the  buyer  is  either  obliged  to  compromise  if  one  spends  y,  or  to 
spend  more  than  y  in  order  to  get  everything  expected  at  the  preliminary 
stage. 
These  assumptions  are  of  a  psychological  nature.  The  interested  reader  is 
referred  to  vP68  rather  than  to  the  fragmentary  resume  of  Seidl  to  get  an 
idea  about  the  generality  and  the  caveats.  We  observe  that  just  as  for  the 
Central  Limit  Theorem  the  lognormality  result  can  be  derived  under  various 
and  also  more  general  conditions  which  are  not  spelled  out  in  vP68.  We  also 
notice  that  the  psychological  (basically  simplifying)  assumptions  on  indivi- 
dual  evaluation  behaviour  need  not  to  be  reflected  in  the  consciousness  of 
the  individual.  It  is  here  that  we  may  draw  the  analogy  with  the  profit- 
maximizing  entrepreneur  who  does  not  know  differential  calculus  or  the 
motor  driver  who  does  not  know  the  laws  of  mechanics  when  he  makes  a 
turn.  Their  behaviour  (and  evaluation  is  also  behaviour)  can  be  described  by 
a  model,  which  the  actor  himself  does  not  know  but  which  he  may  apply 
subconsciously. 
4.1  Seidl’s  criticisms 
4.1.  Boundedness  of  the  LIWFIfrom  below  and from  above 
The  first  point  which  is  the  subject  of  Seidl’s  wrath  is  the  fact  that  we 
assume  that  a  utility  function  of  income  is  bounded  both  from  below  and 
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and  psychological  arguments.  As  we  saw  already,  from  survey  practice  it  is 
quite  clear  that  evaluation  on  an  unbounded  scale  by  respondents  is  rarely  if 
ever  used.  Hence,  from  general  psychology  there  cannot  be  much  support. 
There  is  also  nothing  in  the  ordinal  theory  of  consumer  behaviour  which 
excludes  a  bounded  utility  function  of  income. 
Furthermore,  if  we  accept  that  uncertainty  is  a  feature  of  any  economic 
performance,  decisions  under  uncertainty  are  analyzed  with  the  help  of  utility 
functions.  Consider  a  function  with  constant  absolute  risk  aversion,  viz. 
U(x)  =  1 exp( -ax).  It  is  bounded  between  zero  and  one.  The  utility  function 
with  constant  relative  risk  aversion,  i.e.,  U(x)  =  1 --x-’  (x >  1,  a ~0)  is  also 
bounded.  These  functions  are  regularly  used  in  the  literature  on  decisions 
under  uncertainty  [see  Arrow  (1971)]. 
Samuelson  (1977)  states  on  boundedness:  Menger’s  analysis  has  alerted 
writers  like  Arrow  (1971)  to  the  fact  that,  in  order  to  be  able  to  have  a 
complete  ordering  of  all  probabilistic  outcomes  of  options  in  terms  of 
expected  utilities2  . . .  It  turns  out,  somewhat  surprisingly,  to  imply  that  the 
utility  function  must  be  bounded:  we  cannot  have  utilities  which  are  indefinitely 
large  in either  the  positive  or  negative  direction.  It  appears  that  professor  Seidl 
in  1994  is  still  surprised. 
Professor  Seidl  is  also  confusing  boundedness  with  finite  satiation.  Func- 
tions  may  tend  asymptotically  to  their  upper  bound  while  marginal  utility  is 
positive  everywhere.  Seidl  takes  refuge  to  the  authority  of  Debreu  (1959)  by 
quoting  him  that  there  is  no  finite  satiation  possible.  However,  this  is just  an 
assumption  in  Debreu’s  general  equilibrium  model  with  no  empirical  under- 
pinning.  In  later  studies  on  general  equilibrium  this  assumption  has  been 
weakened  of  course. 
4.2.  The  sigmoid  shape  of  the  LIWFl 
Seidl  criticizes  the  idea  that  a  utility  function  of  money  can  have  a 
convex-concave  shape.  His  gut-feelings  are  based  on  Gossen’s  First  Law 
which  is just  an  intuitively  based  proposition.  According  to  ordinal  consumer 
theory  a  utility  function  is  preferably  quasi-concave  and  this  does  not 
preclude  that  a  utility  function  of  money  may  be  convex  over  a  certain 
income  range.  Although  economists  frequently  assume  Gossen’s  Law  to  hold 
everywhere  without  discussion,  for  the  extremely  poor  Gossen’s  Law  might 
fail  as  every  extra  dollar  brings  them  closer  to  survival.  Hence,  the  utility 
function  would  be  convex  shaped  until  an  individual  exceeds  the  situation  of 
being  poor.  Another  argument  for  possible  convexity  comes  from  Friedman 
and  Savage  (1946)  who  argue  that  gambling  behaviour  or  risk-lovingness  can 
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only  be  explained  by  assuming  an  S-curve  [see  also  Markowitz  (1952)  and 
Kahnemann  and  Tversky  (1979)]. 
4.3.  Style 
In  section  3.2.6  but  actually  in  the  whole  paper  our  colleague  utilizes 
rather  strong  and  suggestive  language,  frequently  calling  our  ideas  ‘absurd’. 
He  attacks  the  style  in  which  vP68  has  been  written  as  ‘extremely  tedious 
reading  due  to  its  multifarious  elusiveness’,  ‘  messy’,  and  he  even  suggests  that 
‘the  reader  was  to  be  lulled  into  the  impression  that  . . .‘. It  is  up  to  the  reader 
to  agree  or  disagree,  how  readable  this  book  is  after  26  years.  However,  by 
doing  so,  Professor  Seidl  invites  us  to  say  a  few  words  on  his  own  style.  We 
are  afraid  that  our  colleague  utilizes  the  same  style  figures  which  he  so 
abhors  in  vP68.  Especially,  when  one  according  to  our  opinion  does  not 
succeed  in  substantiating  rather  strong  claims,  it  would  have  seemed  wise  to 
choose  a  more  modest  approach. 
5.  The  good  empirical  fit  of  the  LIWFI 
Under  this  heading  professor  Seidl  throws  his  final  spear  at  our  work.  As 
the  discussion  would  be  incomprehensible  otherwise,  let  us  first  describe  in  a 
few  sentences  the  measurement  instrument  used.  As  Seidl  departs  from  a  now 
old-fashioned  version  (1971)  and  notation  we  shall  also  use  it  here.  The  so- 
called  Income  Evalution  Question  (IEQ)  runs  as  follows: 
‘Taking  into  account  your  own  situation  with  respect  to  family  and  job 
you  would  call  your  net-income  (including  fringe  benefits  and  after 
subtraction  of  social  security  premiums)  per  week/month/year: 
excellent  if it  were  above  $ .  . . . . . . . . 
good  if it  were  between  S . . . . . . . . . ..and  $........... 
amply  sufficient  if it  were  between  $ . . . . . . . . . ..and  $........... 
sufficient  if it  were  between  S . . . . . . . . . ..and  S........... 
burely  sufficient  if it  were  between  $ . . . . . . . . . ..and  $........... 
insufficient  if it  were  between  $....  . . . . . ..and  $........... 
very  insufficient  if it  were  between  S..  . . . . . . . ..and  S........... 
bad  if it  were  between  $ . . . . . . . . . . .and  $  . . .  . . 
very  bad  if it  were  below  $ . . .  . . . . . . . 
The  resulting  boundaries  (answers)  are  denoted  by  y,,  . . . , y,  respectively.  If 
we  assume  that  the  respondent  attempts  to  inform  us  as  well  as  possible 
about  the  shape  of  his  welfare  function,  we  assume  that  he  minimizes  the 
average  inaccuracy  of  his  answers,  given  that  he  has  to  describe  a  continuous 
phenomenon  in  terms  of  discrete  categories.  Let  the  average  inaccuracy  be 
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where  the  inaccuracy  contribution  of each  interval  is weighted  by  the  welfare 
mass  in that  interval  and  y0 equals  zero  and  y,+i  reaches  infinity.  Given  that 
U(y,J = 0 and  U(y, + 1) = 1, minimizing  yields  the  solution  known  as the  Equal 
Quantile  Assumption,  which  mathematically  reads  as 
U(y,+,)-U(y,)=l/n  for  i=O,...,n-1.  (3) 
This  reasoning  was  first  presented  in  vP68  (p.57)  and  later  on  in  the 
empirical  context  of  Van  Praag  (1971).  Kapteyn  (1977)  showed  that  other 
functions  symmetric  about  zero  yield  the  same  result.  Empirical  evidence  on 
the  Equal  Quantile  Assumption  was  also  presented  in  Van  Praag  (1991, 
1994a, b),  where  it  is  described  how  people  were  asked  to  place  the  verbal 
labels  used  in  the  IEQ  on  a  zero-hundred  scale.  Not  only  did  different 
people  put  the  same  words  roughly  at  the  same  position,  also  it  turned  out 
that  the  equal  interval  assumption  was  a reasonable  (not  perfect)  approxima- 
tion  to  the  observed  positions  chosen  by  the  experimental  subjects. 
Section  4  of  Seidl’s  paper  is  very  confusing,  but  let  us  try  to  get  the  gist 
out  of it. Seidl departs  from  the  idea  that  every  individual  evaluates  income  y 
by  the  same  ‘true’  or  proper  welfare  function  V(y).  In  contrast  to  that,  the 
main  point  of  the  Leyden  approach  is  that  each  individual  has  his/her  own 
individual  welfare  function,  which  depends  on  the  individual’s  own  circum- 
stances,  like family  size and  current  income  y,.  This  function  U(y;  y,,  fs)  may 
be  assessed  for  each  individual  by  the  method  sketched  above.  From  those 
estimates  we may  derive  that  an  individual  evaluates  his  own  current  income 
by  U(y,;  y,,  fs).  Ignoring  fs  we  may  write  V(y,)  for  that  function  and  this 
seems  to  be the  concept  Seidl  has  in mind  as  the  welfare function  ‘proper’.  We 
notice  that  V(  .) is functionally  specified  as soon  as we know  U( .; y,)  for  all y,. 
Now  Seidl  starts  at  the  other  side  and  stipulates  from  psychophysical 
evidence  that  the  function  V(y) should  be  either  logarithmic  In(y)  or  a power 
function.  If  our  estimates  U(y: y,)  do  not  conform  to  the  logarithmic  or  the 
power  function,  it  would  imply  according  to  Seidl  that  U(.)  is  a  transform, 
say,  U( .; y,) = Y(V(.);  y,),  where  the  transform  varies  with  individual  para- 
meters,  e.g. y,. 
It  is  obvious  that  for  any  exogenously  specified  monotonic  function  I’(.) 
we  may  find  a  function  Y  which  performs  this  trick.  This  is  however  no 
proof  that  V(.)  is  the  ‘true’  welfare  function.  In  particular,  it  is no  evidence 
whatsoever  that  a  logarithmic  or  a  power  function  should  be  the  ‘true’ 
welfare  function  V(  .). 
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estimates  to  find  a  unique  function  V(y,),  which  happens  to  be  a  lognormal 
distribution  function  as  well  and  not  a  logarithm  or  a  power  function. 
Is  there  then  support  from  economics  for  those  specifications?  As  Arrow’s 
result  on  bounded  utility  (also  stated  by  e.g.  Von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern 
and  Savage)  implies,  both  functional  specifications  are  inadmissible  from  the 
viewpoint  of  the  theory  of  decision  under  uncertainty  (or  the  dynamic 
theories  of  growth,  savings,  etc.). 
So  Seidl’s  evidence  is  only  the  evidence  from  experimental  psychophysics. 
Let  us  see  what  the  experiments  of  his  ‘good  company’  are.  That  evidence  is 
much  less  firm  than  Seidl  suggests.  For  instance,  it  is  true  that  Stevens  (1957, 
1973)  and  his  ‘numerous  collaborators’  did  ‘innumerable  experiments’  on  the 
subjective  perception  on  sound  intensity,  brightness  of  light,  etc.,  but  their 
experiments  took  place  in  a  laboratory  setting  and  applied  to  a  fairly  narrow 
range  of  stimuli.  Their  studies  allow  only  for  conclusions  for  those  narrow 
ranges.  They  found  an  approximate  double-log  relationship  between  sub- 
jective  evaluations  and  stimuli  for  specific  regions  but  their  statistical 
methodology  was  rather  shaky.  The  same  holds  for  the  case  where  such 
experiments  were  applied  to  the  attitude  towards  money,  presented  by 
Galanter  (1962).  These  authors  do  not  present  any  theory  for  their  experi- 
mental  observations,  nor  do  they  account  for  individual  differences.  Although 
the  experimental  data  in  some  instances  were  fitted  to  other  functional 
specifications,  as  a  rule  no  standard  errors  were  presented  and  formal 
comparisons  of  goodness  of  lit  between  different  specifications  are  conspi- 
cuously  absent.  The  only  thing  is  that  the  logarithm  and/or  power  were 
proposed  as  not  implausible  empirically  fitting  relationships  for  a  certain 
range.  However,  there  are  no  ‘laws’  at  all,  only  empirical  regularities. 
It  is  tempting  to  quote  Samuelson  (1977)  again  on  ‘classical  logarithmic 
utility’.  After  saying  that  Bernoulli  proposed  the  logarithmic  utility  function 
Samuelson  goes  on: 
‘few  economists  will  today  swallow  this  gratuitous  postulate,  but  to 
novitiates  such  argumentation  apparently  carries  some  plausibility  (as  with 
the  Weber-Fechner  law  in  experimental  psychology)‘. 
This  does  not  mean  that  these  experiments  in  the  fifties  and  sixties  are 
without  value.  It  does  only  mean  that  it  is  not  the  God-given  measuring-rod 
against  which  our  results  can  be  discarded  as  trivial  and  nonsensical  or  a 
mere  repetition  of earlier  results. 
6.  Concluding  remarks 
In  this  paper  we  refuted  Seidl’s  principal  points  of  critique  as  ill-founded. 
Obviously,  his  paper  including  the  103  footnotes  abounds  of  other  minor 
points  which  may  be  addressed  as  well.  We  abstain  from  doing  so  in  order  to 
allow  the  reader  to  keep  the  broader  perspective  in  view.  Despite  major B.M.S.  oan Praag  and  A.  Kapteyn,  How  sensible  is the  LIWFI?  1825 
disagreements  with  respect  to  Seidl’s  arguments,  we  will  emphasize,  as 
empirical  scientists,  that  we  are  certainly  not  100%  sure  that  our  results  are 
not  prone  to  criticism  or  that  they  will  have  to  be  discarded  once  in  favour 
of  a  better  theory  and  for  more  convincing  results.  In  this  instance,  however, 
we  see  no  reason  at  all. 
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